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Abstract—We consider a method for preventing e-Fraud in
which a binary image is encrypted with a floating point cipher
using a convolution operation and the output quantized into a
1-bit array generating a binary image ciphertext. The output
is then ‘embedded’ in a host image to hide the encrypted
information. Embedding is undertaken either in the lowest 1-
bit layer or multiple 1-bit layers. Decryption is accomplished
by: (i) extracting the binary image from the host image; (ii)
correlating the result with the original cipher. In principle,
any cipher generator can be used for this purpose and the
method has been designed to operate with 24-bit colour images.
The approach has a variety of applications and in this paper,
we focus on the authentication and self-authentication of e-
documents (letters and certificates, for example) that are
communicated over the Internet and are thereby vulnerable
to e-Fraud (e.g. modification, editing, counterfeiting etc.).
Keywords-Covert encryption, Steganography, Information
hiding, Authentication, e-Fraud
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the principal weaknesses of all encryption systems
is that the form of the output data (the ciphertext), if
intercepted, alerts the intruder to the fact that the information
being transmitted may have some importance and that it is
therefore worth attacking and attempting to decrypt it. This
aspect of ciphertext transmission can be used to propagate
disinformation, achieved by encrypting information that is
specifically designed to be intercepted and decrypted. In this
case, we assume that the intercept will be attacked, decrypted
and the information retrieved. The ‘key’ to this approach
is to make sure that the ciphertext is relatively strong
(but not too strong!) and that the information extracted is
of good quality in terms of providing the attacker with
‘intelligence’ that is perceived to be valuable and compatible
with their expectations, i.e. information that reflects the con-
cerns/interests of the individual(s) and/or organisation(s) that
encrypted the data. This approach provides the interceptor
with a ‘honey pot’ designed to maximize their confidence
especially when they have had to put a significant amount of
work in to ‘extracting it’. The trick is to make sure that this
process is not too hard or too easy. ‘Too hard’ will defeat
the object of the exercise as the attacker might give up; ‘too
easy’, and the attacker will suspect a set-up!
In addition to providing an attacker with a honey-pot for
the dissemination of disinformation, it is of significant value
if a method can be found that allows the real information to
be transmitted by embedding it in non-sensitive information
after (or otherwise) it has been encrypted, e.g. camouflaging
the ciphertext. This is known as Steganography which is
concerned with developing methods of writing hidden mes-
sages in such a way that no one, apart from the intended
recipient, knows of the existence of the message in contrast
to cryptography in which the existence of the message
itself is not disguised but the content is scrambled [1],
[2]. Steganography provides a significant advantage over
cryptography alone in that messages do not attract attention
to themselves, to messengers, or to recipients. No matter
how well plaintext is encrypted (i.e. how unbreakable it is),
by default, a ciphertext will arouse suspicion and may in
itself be incriminating, as in some countries encryption is
illegal.
This paper presents a method of ‘hiding’ encrypted in-
formation in a colour digital image. In principle, any cipher
can be used to do this providing it consists of floating point
(or decimal integer) numbers that are ideally, uniformly
distributed. The scheme allows for the authentication and
self-authentication of documents such as letters, certificates
and other image based data. The encrypted watermark can be
camouflaged to obfuscate its existence and the applications
to which the method can be applied are numerous. For
example, the self-authentication of e-documents sent as
attachments over the internet provides a unique facility for
many legal and financial transactions that have traditionally
relied on paper based documents to secure authenticity.
The method also provides a unique way of ‘propagating’
disinformation in the form of an encrypted document which
contains hidden information.
II. STEGANOGRAPHY
The word ‘Steganography’ is of Greek origin and means
‘covered’, or ‘hidden writing’. In general, a steganographic
message appears as something else known as a covertext.
The conversion of a ciphertext to another plaintext form
is called Stegotext conversion and is based on the use of
Covertext. Some covertext must first be invented and the
ciphertext mapped on to it in some way to produce the
stegotext. This can involve the use of any attribute that is
readily available such as letter size, spacing, typeface, or
other characteristics of a covertext, manipulated in such a
way as to carry a hidden message. The basic principle is
given below:
Data → Covertext
↓
Plaintext → Ciphertext → Stegotext
↓
Transmission
Note that this approach does not necessarily require the use
of plaintext to ciphertext conversion as illustrated above and
that plaintext can be converted into stegotext directly.
With the wealth of data that is generated and transmitted
in todays environment and the wide variety of formats that
are used means that there is much greater potential for ex-
ploiting steganographic methods than before. In other words,
the e-society has generated a camouflage rich environment
in which to operate and one can attempt to hide plaintext or
ciphertext (or both) in a host of data types, including audio
and video files and digital images. Moreover, by understand-
ing the characteristics of a transmission environment, it is
possible to conceive techniques in which information can
be embedded in the transmission noise, i.e. where natural
transmission noise is the covertext. There are some counter
measures - steganalysis - that can be implemented in order
to detect stegotext. However the technique usually requires
access to the covertext which is then compared with the
stegotext to see if any modifications have been introduced.
The problem is to find ways of obtaining the original
covertext.
A. Hiding Data in Images
The relatively large amount of data contained in digital
images makes them a useful ‘medium’ for undertaking
steganography. Consequently digital images can be used to
hide messages in other images. A colour image typically has
8 bits to represent the Red, Green and Blue components.
Each colour component is composed of 256 ‘colour values’
(for a 24-bit image) and the modification of some of these
values in order to hide other data is undetectable by the
human eye. This modification is often undertaken by chang-
ing the least significant bit in the binary representation of a
colour or grey level value (for grey level digital images).
For example, for 7-bit ASCII conversion, the grey level
value 100 has the binary representation 1100100 which is
equivalent to character d. If we change the least significant
bit to give 1100101 (which corresponds to a grey level value
of 101 and character e) then the difference in the output
image will not be discernable even though we have replaced
the letter e with default character d. In this way, the least
significant bit can be used to encode information other than
pixel intensity and the larger the host image compared with
the hidden message, the more difficult it is to detect the
message. In this way it is possible to hide an image in
another image for which there are a number of approaches
available (including the application of bit modification). For
example, Figure 1 shows the effect of hiding one image in
another through the process of re-quantization and addition.
The image to be embedded is re-quantized to just 3-bits
or 8 grey levels so that it consists of an array of values
between 0 to 7. The result is then added to the host image
(an array of values between 0 and 255) on a pixel by pixel
basis such that if the output exceeds 255 then it is truncated
(i.e. set to 255). The resulting output is slightly brighter
with minor distortions in some regions of the image that are
homogeneous.
Figure 1. Illustration of ‘hiding’ one image (top left) in another image
(top right) through simple re-quantization and addition (bottom left). By
subtracting the bottom left image from the top right image and re-quantizing
the output, the bottom right reconstruction is obtained.
Clearly, knowledge of the original host image allows
the hidden image to be recovered (by subtraction) giving
a result that is effectively completely black. However, by
increasing its brightness, the hidden image can be recovered
as shown in Figure 1 which, in this example, has been
achieved by re-quantizing the data from 0-7 back to 0-
255 grey levels. The fidelity of this reconstruction is poor
compared to the original image but it still conveys the basic
information, information that could be covertly transmitted
through the host image as an email attachment, for example.
Note that the host image represents, quite literally, the key
to recovering the hidden image. The additive process that
has been applied is equivalent to the ‘process of confusion’
that is the basis for a substitution cipher. Rather than the
key being used to generate a random number stream using
a pre-defined algorithm from which the stream can be re-
generated (for the same key), the digital image is, in effect,
being used as the cipher. Note that the distortion generated
by re-quantization means that the same method can not
be used if the hidden image is encrypted. The degradation
in the ciphertext will not allow an accurate decrypt to be
accomplished due to loss of data.
Steganography is often used for digital watermarking.
This is where the plaintext, which acts as a simple identifier
containing information such as ownership, copyright and
so on, is hidden in an image so that its source can be
tracked or verified. The methods discussed above refer
to electronic-to-electronic type communications in which
there is no loss of information (assuming the image is not
compressed to JPEG - Joint Photographics Expert Group
- format, for example). Steganography and watermarking
techniques can be developed for hardcopy data which has a
range of applications. These techniques have to be robust to
the significant distortions generated by the printing and/or
scanning process. A simple approach is to add information
to a printed page that is difficult to see. For example, some
modern colour laser printers, including those manufactured
by HP and Xerox, print tiny yellow dots which are added to
each page. The dots are barely visible and contain encoded
printer serial numbers, date and time stamps. This facility
provides a useful forensics tool for tracking the origins of a
printed document.
B. Disinformation
Disinformation is used to tempt the enemy into believing
certain kinds of information. The information may not be
true or contain aspects that are designed to cause the enemy
to react in an identifiable way that provides a strategic
advantage [4], [5]. Camouflage is a simple example of dis-
information [6]. This includes techniques for transforming
encrypted data into forms that resemble the environments
through which an encrypted message is to be sent. At a more
sophisticated level, disinformation can include encrypted
messages that are created with the sole purpose of being
broken in order to reveal information that the enemy will
react to by design [7].
C. Steganographic Encryption
It is arguable that disinformation should, where possible,
be used in conjunction with the exchange of encrypted in-
formation which has been camouflaged using steganographic
techniques for hiding the ciphertext. For example, suppose
that it had been assumed by Germany that the Enigma
ciphers were being compromised by the British during the
Second World War. Clearly, it would have been strategi-
cally advantageous for Germany to propagate disinformation
using Enigma. If, in addition, ‘real information’ had been
encrypted differently and the ciphertexts camouflaged using
broadcasts through the German home radio service, for
example, then the outcome of the war could have been very
different. The use of new encryption methods coupled with
camouflage and disinformation, all of which are dynamic
processes, provides a model that, while not always of
practical value, is strategically comprehensive and has only
rarely been fully realised.
III. STOCHASTIC CONFUSION AND DIFFUSION
In terms of plaintexts, diffusion is concerned with the
issue that, at least on a statistical basis, similar plaintexts
should result in completely different ciphertexts even when
encrypted with the same key. This requires that any element
of the input block influences every element of the output
block in an irregular fashion. In terms of a key, diffusion
ensures that similar keys result in completely different
ciphertexts even when used for encrypting the same block of
plaintext. This requires that any element of the input should
influence every element of the output in an irregular way.
This property must also be valid for the decryption process
because otherwise an intruder may be able to recover parts
of the input from an observed output by a partly correct
guess of the key used for encryption. The diffusion process
is a function of the sensitivity to initial conditions that all
cryptographic systems must have. Further, all cryptographic
systems should exhibit an inherent topological transitivity
causing the plaintext to be mixed through the action of the
encryption process.
The process of ‘confusion’ ensures that the (statistical)
properties of plaintext blocks are not reflected in the cor-
responding ciphertext blocks. Every ciphertext must have
a random appearance to any observer and be quantifiable
through appropriate statistical tests. Diffusion and confusion
are processes that are of fundamental importance in the
design and analysis of cryptological systems, not only for
the encryption of plaintexts but for data transformation in
general.
A. Stochastic Confusion
The simplest approach to encrypting plaintext described
by the vector p (e.g. consisting of 7-bit ASCII decimal
integers) is to add a cipher denoted by n which is taken
to be a stochastic function consisting of random numbers,
i.e. n is a vector consisting of noise. The ciphertext c is then
given by
c = p+ n (1)
This is an example of a substitution cipher and relies on the
use of ciphers that can be regenerated by a ‘key’ which is the
initial condition used to ‘drive’ a random number generated
whose algorithm is known. For a 7-bit ASCII code, if the
value of any element of the array c exceeds 127 then the
result is wrapped (e.g. 121+10=3), the output being taken
to be the modulo of 127. In practice, this process is usually
carried out in ‘binary space’ by first converting the arrays
p and c to binary form pb and cb, respectively. The binary
ciphertext cb is then computed using the XOR operation, i.e.
cb = nb ⊕ pb
The plaintext is given by
pb = nb ⊕ cb
Irrespective of whether this simplest of encryption schemes
is implemented in decimal integer or binary space, it is
imperative that the cipher exhibits statistical properties such
that there is no bias associated with the frequency of occur-
rence of any element. In other words the histrogam of n must
be uniformly distributed in order to counteract a statistical
attack based on analysing the frequency of occurrence of
elements of p in which the space between each word is the
most common. Equivalently, in binary space, it is important
that there is no bias towards a 0 or 1 so that the number of
bits should be the same in any binary cipher. The additive
process associated with equation (1) represents a process
of confusion based on, what is in effect, the addition of a
uniformly distributed noise. It is an example of stochastic
confusion upon which the majority of both substitution and
transposition (or both) ciphers are based. The aim is to
generate a maximum entropy cipher in such a way that there
is maximum possible diffusion in terms of key dependency
(i.e. that a change in any single bit of the key can effect
any, and potentially, all bits of the cipher). This is the usual
concept in which the term diffusion is used in cryptology,
the aim being to maximize (in terms of the entropy of the
ciphertext) the process of both diffusion and confusion.
B. Stochastic Diffusion
In this paper we consider the diffusion of plaintext in
terms of the convolution of a plaintext array with the cipher,
the ciphertext being given by
c[i] = n[i]⊗ p[i] =
∑
j
n[j − i]p[j]
where ⊗ denotes the convolution sum as defined above.
It is well known that for x ∈ (−∞,∞), the solution to
the diffusion equation
(D∂2x − ∂t)c(x, t) = 0, c(x, 0) = p(x)
where D is the Diffusivity and p(x) is the initial condition,
is given by [9]
c(x, t) = g(x, t)⊗x p(x) =
∞∫
−∞
g(y − x, t)p(y)dy
where ⊗x now represents the convolution integral (over
independent variable x) as defined above and
g(x, t) =
√
1
4piDt
exp
(
− x
2
4Dt
)
Here, the diffusion of p(x) is determined by a convolution
with a Gaussian function whose standard deviation is deter-
mined by the product of the Diffusivity D and the time t
over which the diffusion process occurs. Stochastic diffusion
is based on replacing the convolution kernel (i.e. the function
g) for a stochastic function n so that
c(x, t) = n(x, t)⊗x p(x)
For any time t, the ciphertext is given by the convolution of
the plaintext with the cipher. In this sense, any fixed value
of time ti, i = 1, 2, 3... can be taken to represent the initial
value used to generate n(x), i.e. the key used to initiate a
random number generating algorithm.
The inverse problem associated with stochastic diffusion
as defined above is not as simple as applying an XOR
operation to the ciphertext in binary space. In this case we
are required to apply a suitable deconvolution process, i.e.
to solve the problem: Given c and n, compute p. We can
deconvolve by using the convolution theorem giving
p(x) = F−11
[
C(k)N∗(k)
| N(k) |2
]
where N is the Fourier transform of n, C is the Fourier
transform of c, k is the spatial frequency and F−11 denotes
the (one-dimensional) inverse Fourier transform, i.e. for a
piecewise continuous function f(x) with spectrum denoted
by F (k),
F−11 [F (k)] =
1
2pi
∞∫
−∞
F (k) exp(ikx)dx = f(x)
This approach requires regularization in order to eliminate
any singularities when | N |2→ 0 through application
of a constrained deconvolution filter [10], [11]. It is not
appropriate for encryption because the inverse process is
fundamentally ill-conditioned. Instead we consider a method
which allows the inverse problem to be solved directly
by correlation. To do this the cipher needs to be ‘pre-
conditioned’. We let
m(x) = F−11 [M(k)]
where ∀k
M(k) =
{
N∗(k)
|N(k)|2 , | N(k) |6= 0;
N∗(k), | N(k) |= 0.
The ciphertext is then given by
c(x) = m(x)⊗x p(x)
This result allows us to solve the inverse problem by
correlating (denoted by x) c with n. This is based on the
following analysis: Using the convolution theorem
m(x)⊗x p(x)↔M(k)P (k)
and, using the correlation theorem,
n(x)x c(x)↔ N∗(k)C(k)
where ↔ denotes transformation into Fourier space. Thus
N∗(k)C(k) = N∗(k)M(k)P (k) = N∗(k)
N∗(k)
| N(k) |2 = P (k)
so that
p(x) = n(x)x c(x)
The pre-conditioning of a cipher so that decryption can
be undertaken using correlation provides a simple solution
for utilizing the process of stochastic diffusion to encrypt
data. In this paper, the process is applied in ‘image space’
to watermark a digital image.
IV. DIGITAL IMAGE WATERMARKING
In ‘image space’, we consider the plaintext to be an image
p(x, y) of compact support x ∈ [−X,X]; y ∈ [−Y, Y ].
Stochastic diffusion is then based on the following results:
Encryption
c(x, y) = m(x, y)⊗x ⊗yp(x, y)
where
m(x, y) = F−12 [M(kx, ky)]
and ∀kx, ky
M(kx, ky) =
{
N∗(kx,ky)
|N(kx,ky)|2 , | N(kx, ky) |6= 0;
N∗(kx, ky), | N(kx, ky) |= 0.
Decryption
p(x, y) = n(x, y)x yc(x, y)
Here, kx and ky are the spatial frequencies and F−12 denotes
the two-dimensional inverse Fourier transform. For digital
image watermarking, we consider a discrete array pij , i =
1, 2, ..., I; j = 1, 2, ..., J of size I × J and discrete versions
of the operators involved, i.e. application of a discrete
Fourier transform and discrete convolution and correlation
sums.
If we consider a host image denoted by h(x, y), then we
consider a watermarking method based on the equation
c(x, y) = Rm(x, y)⊗x ⊗yp(x, y) + h(x, y)
where
‖m(x, y)⊗x ⊗yp(x, y)‖∞ = 1
and
‖h(x, y)‖∞ = 1
By normalising the terms in this way, the coefficient 0 ≤
R ≤ 1 can be used to adjust the relative magnitudes of the
terms such that the diffused image m(x, y)⊗x⊗yp(x, y) be-
comes a perturbation of the ‘host image’ (covertext) h(x, y).
This provides us with a way of digital watermarking [12] one
image with another, R being referred to as the ‘watermarking
ratio’, a term that is equivalent, in this application, to the
standard term ‘Signal-to-Noise’ or SNR as used in signal
and image analysis. For colour images, the method can
be applied by decomposing the image into its constituent
Red, Green and Blue components. Stochastic diffusion is
then applied to each component separately and the result
combined to produce an colour composite image.
For applications in image watermarking, stochastic diffu-
sion has two principal advantages:
• a stochastic field provides uniform diffusion;
• stochastic fields can be computed using random number
generators that depend on a single initial value or seed
(i.e. a private key).
A. Binary Image Watermarks
Watermarking a full grey level or colour image in another
grey or colour image, respectively, using stochastic diffusion
leads to two problems: (i) it can yield a degradation in the
quality of the reconstruction especially when R is set to
a low value which is required when the host image has
regions that are homogeneous; (ii) the host image can be
corrupted by the watermark leading to distortions that are
visually apparent. Points (i) and (ii) lead to an optimisation
problem with regard to the fidelity of the watermark and
host images in respect of the value of the watermark ratio
that can be applied which limits the type of host images
that can be used and the fidelity of the ‘decrypts’. However,
if we consider the plaintext image p(x, y) to be of binary
form, then the output of stochastic diffusion can be binarized
to give a binary ciphertext. The rationale for imposing this
condition is based on considering a system in which a user
is interested in covertly communicating documents such as
confidential letters and certificates, for example.
If we consider a plaintext image p(x, y) which is a binary
array, then stochastic diffusion using a pre-conditioned ci-
pher 0 ≤ m(x, y) ≤ 1 consisting of an array of floating point
numbers will generate a floating point output. The Shannon
Information Entropy of any array A(xi, yi) with Probability
Mass Function (PMF) p(zi) is given by
I = −
∑
i=1
p(zi) log2 p(zi)
The information entropy of a binary plaintext image (with
PMF consisting of two components whose sum is 1) is
therefore significantly less than the information entropy of
the ciphertext image. In other words, for a binary plaintext
and a non-binary cipher, the ciphertext is data redundant.
This provides us with the opportunity of binarizing the
ciphertext by applying a threshold T , i.e. if cb(x, y) is the
binary ciphertext, then
cb(x, y) =
{
1, c(x, y) > T
0, c(x, y) ≤ T (2)
where 0 ≤ c(x, y) ≤ 1∀x, y. A digital binary ciphertext
image cb(xi, yj) where
cb(xi, yi) =
{
1, or
0, for any xi, yj
can then be used to watermark an 8-bit host image
h(x, y), h ∈ [0, 255] by replacing the lowest 1-bit layer
with cb(xi, xj). To recover this information, the 1-bit layer
is extracted from the image and the result correlated with
the digital cipher n(xi, yj). Note that the original floating
point cipher n is required to recover the plaintext image
and that the binary watermark can not therefore be attacked
on an exhaustive XOR basis using trial binary ciphers, i.e.
binarization of a stochastically diffused data field is entirely
irreversible.
B. Statistical Analysis
The expected statistical distribution associated with
stochastic diffusion is Gaussian. This can be shown if we
consider a binary plaintext image pb(x, y) to be described
by a sum of N delta functions where each delta function
describes the location of a non-zero bit at coordinates
(xi, yj). Thus if
pb(x, y) =
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
δ(x− xi)δ(y − yj)
then
c(x, y) = m(x, y)⊗x ⊗yp(x, y)
=
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
m(x− xi, y − yj).
Each function m(x− xi, y − yj) is just m(x, y) shifted by
xi, yj and will thus be identically distributed. Hence, from
the Central Limit Theorem
Pr[c(x, y)] = Pr
 N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
m(x− xi, y − yj)
 =
N∏
i=1
⊗ Pr[m(x, y)] ≡ Pr[m(x, y)]⊗x⊗yPr[m(x, y)]⊗x⊗y...
∼ Gaussian(z), N →∞
where Pr denotes the Probability Density Function. We can
thus expect Pr[c(x, y)] to be normally distributed and for
m(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]∀x, y the mode of the distribution will be
of the order of 0.5. This result provides a value for the
threshold T in equation (2) which for 0 ≤ c(x, y) ≤ 1 is 0.5
(theoretically). Note that if n(x, y) is uniformly distributed
and thereby represents δ-uncorrelated noise then both the
complex spectrum N∗ and power spectrum | N |2 will also
be δ-uncorrelated and since
m(x, y) = F−12
[
N∗(kx, ky)
| N(kx, ky) |2
]
Pr[m(x, y)] will be uniformly distributed. Also note that the
application of a threshold which is given by the mode of the
Gaussian distribution, guarantees that there is no statistical
bias associated with any bit in the binary output, at least, on
a theoretical basis. On a practical basis, the threshold needs
to be computed directly by calculating the mode from the
histogram of the cipher and that bit equalization can not be
guaranteed as it will depend on: (i) the size of the images
used; (ii) the number of bins used to compute the histogram.
C. Principal Algorithms
The principal algorithms associated with the application
of stochastic diffusion for binary image watermarking are as
follows:
Algorithm I: Encryption and Watermarking Algorithm
Step 1: Read the binary plaintext image from a file and
compute the size I × J of the image.
Step 2: Compute a cipher of size I × J using a private key
and pre-condition the result.
Step 3: Convolve the binary plaintext image with the pre-
conditioned cipher and normalise the output.
Step 4: Binarize the output obtained in Step 3 using a
threshold based on computing the mode of the Gaussian
distributed ciphertext.
Step 5: Insert the binary output obtained in Step 4 into the
lowest 1-bit layer of the host image and write the result to
a file.
The following points should be noted:
(i) The host image is taken to be an 8-bit or higher grey
level image which should ideally be the same size as the
plaintext image or else resized accordingly. However, in
resizing the host image, its proportions should be the same
so that the stegotext image does not appear to be a distorted
version of the covertext image. For this purpose, a library
of host images should be developed whose dimensions are
set according to a predetermined application where the
dimensions of the plaintext image are known.
(ii) Pre-conditioning the cipher and the convolution pro-
cesses are undertaken using a Discrete Fourier Transform
(DFT).
(iii) The output given in Step 3 will include negative floating
point numbers upon taking the real component of a complex
array. The array must be rectified by adding the largest
negative value in the output array to the same array before
normalisation.
(iv) For colour host images, the binary ciphertext can be
inserted in to one or all of the RGB components. This
provides the facility for watermarking the host image with
three binary ciphertexts (obtained from three separate binary
documents, for example) into a full colour image. In each
case, a different key can be used.
(v) The binary plaintext image should have homogeneous
margins in order to minimise the effects of ringing due
to ‘edge-effects’ when processing the data in the spectral
domain.
Algorithm II: Decryption Algorithm
Step 1: Read the watermarked image from a file and extract
the lowest 1-bit layer from the image.
Step 2: Regenerate the (non-preconditioned) cipher using
the same key used in Algorithm I.
Step 3: Correlate the cipher with the input obtained in Step
1 and normalise the result.
Step 4: Quantize and format the output from Step 3 and
write to a file.
The following points should be noted:
(i) The correlation operation should be undertaken using a
DFT.
(ii) For colour images, the data is decomposed into each
RGB component and each 1-bit layer is extracted and
correlated with the appropriate cipher, i.e. the same cipher
or three ciphers relating to three private keys respectively.
(iii) The output obtained in Step 3 has a low dynamic
range and therefore requires to be quantized into an 8-bit
image based on floating point numbers within the range
max(array)-min(array).
Figure 2 shows the result of applying Algorithm I and
Algorithm II for a full colour 24-bit image. This example
illustrates the embedding of a binary ciphertext into the
lowest 1-bit level of a host image which provides a facility
to ‘hide’ information in a host image without impeding its
fidelity. In this example, the binary cipher has been inserted
into each RGB component. This improves the fidelity of the
decrypt which becomes the result of contributions from all
three colour channels rather than one channel in the case of
a grey level image.
D. 2-bit Randomization
A principal weakness in the algorithms proposed is that
the binary watermark is inserted into the lowest 1-bit layer
of the host image. The ciphertext can therefore easily
Figure 2. Example of stochastic diffusion applied to a 24-bit colour image
(top-left) used to hide an encrypted image of a plaintext image with different
font sizes (top-right). The fidelity of the decrypt (bottom-left) is enhanced
through the use of a colour host image and watermarking all three colour
components with the same watermark. The result can then be post-processed
to generate a high quality reconstruction of the original plaintext (bottom-
right) which in this case has been generated using a Gaussian lowpass
filter with a radius of 1 pixel followed by binarization using a user defined
threshold adjusted to give a visually optimal result.
be removed and cryptanalysed. A simple solution to this
problem is to randomize the watermark over the lowest 2-
bit layers of the host image. Thus if cb(xi, xj) is the binary
watermark of size X × Y and 0 ≤ r(xi, yj) ≤ 1 is an array
of uniformly distributed floating point numbers (also of size
X × Y ) we apply the quantization
∀xi, yj ∈ [X × Y ]
R(xi, yj) =

0, 0 ≤ r(xi, yj) < 0.333;
1, 0.333 ≤ r(xi, yj) < 0.666;
2, 0.666 ≤ r(xi, yj) < 1;
The watermark is then 2-bit randomized by simple array
addition to give
C(xi, xj) = cb(xi, xj) +R(xi, yj)
The 2-bit array C then replaces the lowest 2-bit layer of the
host image. The 1-bit watermark is recovered using array
subtraction, i.e.
cb(xi, xj) = C(xi, xj)−R(xi, yj)
which requires that r can be reproduced (using a known
cipher generating algorithm with a known ‘key’).
V. STEGOCRYPT
StegoCrypt has been designed using MATLAB to examine
the applications to which stochastic diffusion can be used. It
has been designed with a simple Graphical User Interface as
shown in Figure 3 whose use is summarised in the following
table:
Encryption Mode Decryption Mode
Inputs: Inputs:
Plaintext image Stegotext image
Covertext image Private key (PIN)
Private Key (PIN)
Output: Output:
Watermarked Covertext image Decrypted watermark
Operation: Operation:
Encrypt by clicking on Decrypt by clicking on
button E (for Encrypt) button D (for Dycrypt)
The PIN (Personal Identity Number) is an alpha-numerical
Figure 3. Graphical User Interface for StegoCrypt software system.
string with upto 16 elements, generated automatically upon
encryption, by default. In principal, any existing encryption
algorithm, application or system can be used to generate
the cipher required by StegoCrypt by encrypting an image
composed of random noise. The output then needs to be con-
verted into a decimal integer array and the result normalised
as required, i.e. depending on the format of the output that is
produced by a given system. In this way, StegoCrypt can be
used in conjunction with any existing encryption standard.
VI. EXAMPLE APPLICATION OF E-FRAUD PREVENTION
The principal aim of the approach described in this paper
is to encrypt an image and transform the ciphertext into a
binary array which is then used to watermark a host image.
This provides a general method for hiding encrypted infor-
mation in ‘image-space’. In this sense, we have developed
a covert encryption method for Electronic Data Interchange
(EDI)
A. e-Fraud Prevention of e-Certificates
Electronic or e-documents consisting of letters and certifi-
cates, for example, are routinely used in EDI. EDI refers to
the structured transmission of data between organizations by
electronic means. It is used to transfer electronic documents
from one computer system to another; from one trading
partner to another trading partner, for example [13], [14].
The USA National Institute of Standards and Technology
defines EDI as the computer-to-computer interchange of
strictly formatted messages that represent documents other
than monetary instruments [15]. EDI remains the data format
used by the vast majority of electronic transactions in the
world and EDI documents generally contain the same infor-
mation that would normally be found in a paper document
used for the same organizational function.
In terms of day-to-day applications, EDI relates to the use
of transferring documents between two parties in terms of an
attachment. For hardcopies, the attachment is typically the
result of scanning the document and generating an image
which is formatted as a JPEG or PDF (Print Device File)
file, for example. This file is then sent as an attachment to an
email which typically refers to the attachment, i.e. the email
acts as a covering memorandum to the information contained
in the attachment. However, a more common approach is
to print a document directly to PDF file, for example.
Thus, letters written in Microsoft word, for example, can
be routinely printed to a PDF file for which there are
a variety of systems available, e.g. PDF suite http://pdf-
format.com/suite/.
For letters and other documents that contain confidential
information, encryption systems are often used to secure
the document before it is attached to an email and sent.
The method discussed in this paper provides a way of
encrypting a document using stochastic diffusion and then
hiding the output in an image, thus providing a covert
method of transmitting encrypted information. However, the
approach can also be used to authenticate a document by
using the original document as a ‘host image’. In terms of the
StegoCrypt GUI shown in Figure 3, this involves using the
same file for the Input and Host Image. An example of this
is shown in Figure 4 where a hardcopy issue of a certificate
has been scanned into electronic form and the result printed
to a PDF file. The properties of the image are as follows:
File size=3.31Mb; Pixel Dimensions - Width=884 pixels,
Height =1312 pixels; Document Size - Width=39.5 cm,
Height=46.28cm; Resolution=28 pixels/cm. The result has
been encrypted and binarised using stochastic diffusion and
the output used to watermark the original document. The
fidelity of the decrypt is perfectly adequate to authenticate
aspects of the certificate such as the name and qualifications
of the holder, the date and signatures, for example. Figure 5
shows the ‘Coat of Arms’ and the signatures associated with
the decrypt given in Figure 4. These results illustrate that the
decrypt is adequately resolved for the authentication of the
document as a whole. It also illustrates the ability for the
decrypt to retain the colour of the original plaintext image.
Figure 4. Certificate with binary watermark (left) and decrypt (right).
Figure 5. ‘Coat of Arms’ (left) and signatures (right) of decrypt given in
Figure 4.
B. Authentication of Electronic Letters
When a document is scanned, noise is generated and
becomes an inherent feature of the image even though
it may not be visually intrusive, e.g. the image of the
scanned certificate given in Figure 4. Low level scan noise
in a digital image of a scanned document with a uniform
(typically white) background is of value in camouflaging the
existence of a 1-bit or randomized 2-bit based watermark.
However, when an image of a letter is generated directly (i.e.
printed to a PDF file from Microsoft Word, for example),
no noise is generated. This provides a method of revealing
the existence, or otherwise, of the watermark. The solution
is to add low level noise to the image before inserting
the watermark so that it is not clear as to whether the
information revealed by statistical inspection of the image
is due to the presence of a watermark or background
noise. For users of Microsoft word, the solution is to use
a texture (Format→Background→Fill Effect...) to generate
an inhomogeneous background or to include a Picture Wa-
termark (Format→Background→Printed Watermark...) with
Washout. By using ‘printed watermarks’ that have been
generated using texture codes, an additional level of authen-
tication can be used even if the document is printed [19],
[20].
One of the weaknesses of watermarking a letter with itself
(a form of self-authentication) is the range of Cribs that are
available to an attacker who has extracted the watermark and
undertaking cryptanalysis. Thus, ideally, features such as the
letter headings and date, for example, should be eliminated
from the host image before encryption is undertaken, leaving
just the text and important features such as the signature, for
example, as agreed by the user(s).
C. Plausible Deniability
Another reason for encrypting plaintext before generating
stegotext is to provide a solution that allows a sender to
decrypt the data to provide plausible information if forced
to do so. With regard to this application, it is possible to
develop different encrypted information which is embedded
into the host image at additional layers. Thus, in addition
to replacing the lowest 1-bit layer of the host image with
the binary ciphertext, the next lowest 1-bit layer is replaced
with another binary ciphertext. If cb,1[i][j] and cb,2[i][j] are
two distinct binary cipheretext images, both consisting of
elements that are either 0 or 1, then the first and second 1-
bit layers of the covertext image are replaced with cb,1[i][j]
and 2 + cb,2[i][j] respectively. This process can be repeated
for further layers depending on the characteristics of the host
image, i.e. the redundancy of pixel values in each 1-bit layer
with regard to the fidelity of the stegotext image.
D. Key-Exchange
In order to use StegoCrypt effectively the system must
be designed with: (i) a cryptographically secure cipher
generator; (ii) a key exchange algorithm. With regard to
point (ii) there are a range of key exchange algorithms
available that can be implemented [16]. A common solution
is to utilise the RSA algorithm, not to encrypt plaintext, but
to encrypt and transmit the keys used to drive a symmetric
encryption system of which StegoCrypt is a typical example.
RSA based products are available commercially from a
range of providers, e.g. http://www.rsa.com/.
VII. DISCUSSION
The use of the internet to transfer documents as image
attachments has and continues to grow rapidly as part of
a global EDI infrastructure. It is for this ‘market’ that
the approach reported in this paper has been developed.
Inserting a binary watermark into a host image obtained by
binarizing a floating point ciphertext of a document provides
a cryptographically secure solution. Although the watermark
can be easily removed from the covertext image - unless 2-
bit randomization is implemented as discussed in Section
IV(D) - it can not be decrypted without the recipient having
access to the correct cryptographically secure algorithm and
key. The encrypted watermark is not ‘suspicious’ especially
when a document has background scan noise, for example,
or a background texture has been introduced as discussed in
Section VI(B).
The key-exchange approach briefly discussed in Section
VII(D) is typical of an infrastructure based on a single
sender-receiver scenario in which the use of a system
such as StegoCrypt is downloaded and installed by both
parties or is accessible on-line. In this case, the algorithm
used to generate the cipher is the same and the security
is based on the PIN which is exchanged using a Public
Key Infrastructure. For example, many institutes such as
universities still issue ‘paper certificates’ to their graduates.
These certificates are then scanned and sent as attachments
along with a CV and covering letter when applying for a job.
It is at this point that the certificate may be counterfeited and,
for this reason, some establishments still demand originals
to be submitted. StegoCrypt provides the facility to issue
electronic certificates (in addition or in substitution to a
hardcopy) which can then be authenticated as discussed
in Section VI(A). By including a serial number on each
certificate (a Certificate Identity Number) which represents a
‘public key’, the document can be submitted to the authority
that issued the certificate for authentication, for which an
online service can be established as required subject to any
regulation of investigatory powers e.g. [25].
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